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1 A Two-person Zero-Sum Dynamic Game with a Parameter
We give a two-person zero-sum dynamic game with a parameter $(DPG_{\theta})$ by
a sequence of the following objects
$(S_{n}, A_{n}, Bn’ t_{n}+1, un’ v_{n}, \theta;n\in N)$ (1.1)
where
1. $S_{n}$ is the state space at time $n\in N$ and is assumed to be a Borel space,
that is, a nonempty Borel subset of a complete separable metric space.
2. $A_{n}$ and $B_{n}$ are the $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{t},\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}$ spaces at time $n\in N$ of players I and II,
respectively. It is assumed that $A_{n}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\dot{\mathrm{d}}B_{n}$ are Borel spaces.
3. $\{t_{n+1}\}$ is the law of motion of the system; $t_{n+1}$ is a Borel measurable tran-
sition probability from $H_{n}A_{n}B_{n}$ to $S_{n+1},$ $n\in \mathit{1}\mathrm{V}$ . Here, $H_{1}=S_{1},$ $H_{n}=$
$S1A1B1\ldots sn-1A_{n-}1Bn-1sn’ H_{\infty}=S_{1}A_{1}B_{1}s2A2B_{2}s_{3}\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot$ . Then, $H_{n}$ is
the set of histories of the game for horizon $n\in N$ , while $H_{\infty}$ is the set of
all infinite histories of the game.
4. $u_{n}$ : $H_{n}A_{n}B_{n}arrow \mathbb{R}$ , is a Borel measurable function and $v_{n}$ : $H_{n}A_{n}B_{n}arrow$
$\mathbb{R}_{+}$ , is a nonnegative bounded Borel measurable function, where $\mathbb{R}_{+}=$
$(0, \infty)$ . Of course, $u_{n}$ and $v_{n}$ may be recognized as functions on $H_{\infty}$ .
Doing so, we assume that
$\lim_{narrow\infty}u_{n}=u\in \mathbb{R},\lim_{narrow\infty}v_{n}=v\in \mathbb{R}_{+}$ .
5. $\theta$ : $S_{1}arrow \mathbb{R}$ is a real valued function , which is called a parameter function
of the game.
6. $T_{\theta}^{n}=u_{n}-\theta v_{n}$ : $H_{n}A_{n}B_{n}arrow \mathbb{R}$ , is a loss function of player I at stage
$n\in N\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}-T_{\theta}^{n}$ , is a loss function of player II.
Let $F_{n}(G_{n})$ be the set of all universally measurable transition probabilities
from $H_{n}(H_{n})$ to $A_{n}(B_{n})$ . A universally measurable strategy of player I(II) is
a sequence $f=\{f_{n}\}(g=\{g_{n}\})$ such $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}.f_{n}\in F_{n}(g_{n}\in G_{n})$ for each $n\in N$ .
Denote by $F(G)$ the set of all strategies for player I(II).
Let $E_{f_{n}},$ $E_{g_{n}t_{n}},$$E+1$ denote the conditional expectation operator with respect
to $f_{n}\in F_{n},$ $g_{n}\in G_{n},$ $t_{n+1}$ , respectively. Then, each pair of strategies $f=$
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$\{$ .$f_{7\iota}\}(g=\{g_{n}\}),$ togetller with the law of motion $\{t_{7\iota+1}\}$ , defines uniquely a uni-
versally measurable transition probability $P_{jg}(\cdot|\cdot)$ from $S_{1}$ to $A_{1}B_{1}S2A2B2s_{3}\cdots$
such that, for two bounded Borel measurable functions $u_{n},$ $v_{n}$ defined on $H_{n}A_{n}B_{n}$
$(n\in N)$ , we have for $s_{1}\in S_{1}$ and $h\in H_{\infty}$ ,
$E(u_{7l}, f, g)(S1)= \int u_{n}(h)P_{fg}(dh|S_{1})$
$=E_{f_{1}}E_{\mathit{9}}E_{t}12\ldots fE-1nE_{g_{n-1}}Et_{n}EfnE_{g}u_{n}(n1)s$
and
$E(vfn” g)(s1)= \int v_{n}(h)Pfg(dh|s_{1})$
$=E_{j_{1}}E_{gt_{2}}1E$ . . . $E_{Jn-1}EEtnEg_{n-}1f_{n}Eg_{\gamma 1}nv(6_{1})$
where $u_{n}$ and $v_{n}$ are also regarded as functions on $H_{\infty}$ .
Under our assumptions, we infer that, for each $s_{1}\in S_{1},$ $f=\{f_{n}\}\in F,$ $g=$
$\{g_{n}\}\in G$ , from the dominated convergence theorem and Fubini’s theorem
$U(f,g)(s1)= \lim_{arrow n\infty}E$ (u $f$n” $g$ ) $(S1)$
$= \lim_{narrow\infty}EE$ E$J1g_{1}$ t2 $\ldots fEn-1gEE_{t_{n}}n-1Ef_{n}E_{gn}u_{n}(s1)$
$= \lim_{narrow\infty}EEEt_{2}\ldots Eg_{1JJ}1\mathit{9}n-1E\cdot n-1E_{t_{n}}E_{gn}Ej_{n}un(S1)$
and
$V(f, g)(S1)= \lim_{narrow\infty}E(v_{n’.f}., g)(s1)$
$– \lim_{narrow\infty}Ef1g_{1}EEt2\ldots EJ\eta-1gn-1t_{\mathrm{n}}fEEEnE\mathit{9}nv(n1)s$
$=narrow\infty 1\mathrm{i}_{\ln}EE_{f1}g1E_{t_{\underline{9}}fn}\ldots EEEt_{n}EE_{fn}v_{n}-1-1gn(g_{n}1)s$.
For the loss function with the parameter function $\theta$ ;
$T_{\theta}^{n}=u_{n}-\theta v_{n}$ ,
we have for each $s_{1}\in S_{1},$ $f=\{f_{n}\}\in F,$ $g=\{g_{n}\}\in G$ ,
$T_{\theta}(f, g)(s1)= \lim_{narrow\infty}EfgT^{n}\theta(.t,g)(S_{1})$
$=U(f, g)(S1)-\theta(_{S_{1}})V(f, g)(S_{1})$ .
We define for initial state $s_{1}\in S_{1}$ ,
$\overline{T}_{\theta}(_{S_{1}})=\inf_{f\in Fg}\sup_{G\in}T\theta(f, g)(S_{1}),$ $\underline{T}_{\theta}(s_{1})=\sup_{g\in G}\inf_{f\in F}T\theta(f, g)(s1)$ .
Then, $\overline{T}_{\theta}(s1)(\underline{T}\theta(s1))$ is called the upper (the lower) value function of the
parametric game. In general, it holds that $\overline{T}_{\theta}(s_{1})\geq\underline{T}_{\theta}(s_{1})$ for all $s_{1}\in S_{1}$ .
Further, we call the duality gap the interval $[\underline{T}_{\theta}(S_{1}), \overline{\tau}\theta(s1)]$ for all $s_{1}\in S_{1}$ .
Definition 1.1 We shall say that the two-person zero-sum game $(DPG_{\theta})$ has
$a$ saddle value function $($ in $short_{2}$ $a$ value function $)_{i}$ if
$\overline{T}_{\theta}(_{S_{1}})=^{\underline{\tau}}\theta(S_{1})=T(\theta^{*})6_{1}$
and this common function is called the value function of the game and is denoted
by $T_{\theta}^{*}(s_{1})$ .
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Definition 1.2 A strategy $\overline{f}\in F$ is said to be $a$ mini-sup of the game $(DPG_{\theta})$
if
$\sup_{g\in G}T\theta(\overline{f}, g).(s1)=\underline{T}_{\theta}(s_{1})$
and a strategy $\overline{g}\in G$ is said to be $a$ $\max$-inf of the game $(DPG_{\theta})$ if
$\inf_{f\in F}T_{\theta}(f,\overline{g})(s1)=\overline{T}_{\theta}(s_{1})$ .
Definition 1.3 A pair strategies $(.\overline{f},\overline{g})\in F\cross G$ is said to be $a$ saddle point
of the game $(DPG_{\theta})$ if
$\inf_{f\in F}T_{\theta}(f,\overline{g})(S1)=T\theta(\overline{f},\overline{g})(S_{1})=\sup_{g\in G}\tau\theta(\overline{f},g)(S_{1})$ .
2 A Two-Person Zero-Sum Dynamic Fractional Game
We define a two-person $\mathrm{z}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}-\mathrm{s}\mathrm{u}\ln \mathrm{d}\mathrm{y}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{i}_{\mathrm{C}}$ fractional game $(DFG)$ as follows :
( $S_{n},$ $A_{n},$ $Bn’ t+1,$ u$n$ n’ $vn’\overline{\theta},$ $\underline{\theta};n\in l\mathrm{V}$ ) (2.1)
where $S_{n}$ is the state space and $A_{n}$ and $B_{n}$ are the action spaces at time $n\in N$
of players I and II, respectively. $\{t_{n+1}\}$ is the law of motion of the system. These
terms are defined like as the game $(DPG_{\theta})$ . Further, $u_{n}$ : $H_{n}A_{n}B_{n}arrow \mathbb{R}$ , is a
bounded Borel measurable function $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\dot{\mathrm{d}}v_{n}$ : $H_{n}A_{n}’ B_{n}arrow \mathbb{R}_{+}$ , is a nonnegative
bounded Borel measurable function, $\mathbb{R}_{+}=(0, \infty)$ . We assume that
$\lim_{narrow\infty}u_{n}=u\in \mathbb{R},\lim_{narrow\infty}v_{n}=v\in \mathbb{R}_{+}$ .
Under our $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{U}\ln_{\mathrm{P}}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{s}$ , we infer that, for each $s_{1}\in S_{1},$ $.f=\{f_{n}\}\in F,$ $g=$
$\{g_{n}\}\in G$ ,
$U(f,g)(s1)= \lim_{narrow\infty}E(u_{n}, f, g)(s_{1}),$ $V(f, g)(S_{1})= \lim_{narrow\infty}E(v_{n}, f, g)(s1)>0$ .
Using the notations $U(f, g)(s1)$ and $V(.f, g)(s1)$ , we give
$W(f, g)(s_{1})= \frac{U(.f,g)(S1)}{V(f,g)(S1)}$
and we define for an initial state $s_{1}\in S_{1}$ ,
$\overline{\theta}(s_{1})=\inf_{f\in Fg}\sup_{\in G}W(f, g)(s1),$ $\underline{\theta}(s_{1})=,\sup_{(\in G}\inf_{f\in F}\mathrm{T}/\mathrm{T}f(.f\cdot$ . $(J)$ ($1I $\cdot$
Then, $\overline{\theta}(s_{1})(\underline{\theta}(s_{1}))$ is called the upper (the lower) value function of the game
$(DFG)$ . In general, it holds that $\overline{\theta}(s_{1})\geq\underline{\theta}(s_{1})$ for all $s_{1}\in S_{1}$ and the interval
$[\underline{\theta}(s_{1}),\overline{\theta}(s_{1})]$ is called the duality gap of the game $(DFG)$ .
Definition 2.1 The game $(DFG)$ is said to have $a$ value function if the
duality gap is equal to zero. We shall call the value function of the $gan?e(DFG)$
the common value function
$\overline{\theta}(s_{1})=\underline{\theta}(s1)=\theta^{*}(s_{1})$ .
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$Further_{i}g^{*}\in C_{7}$ is said to be $a$ $\max$-inf of the game $(DFG)$ if
$\overline{\theta}(S_{1})=\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{f}J\in$ $\sup_{\in CjG}W(.f,g)(s1)=\inf_{f\in F}W(f, g^{*})(S_{1})$ . (2.2)
Similarly. .$f^{\mathrm{x}}\in F$ is said to be $a$ lnini-sup of the gamc $(DFG)$ if
$\underline{\theta}(s_{1})=\sup_{\in Cjc\tau}\inf W(J\in Ff, g)(s1)=\sup_{g\in G}W(.f^{*}, g)(S1)$ . (2.3)
Lemma 2.1 $\overline{T}_{\theta}(s_{1})$ has the following properties.
(1) If $tn^{\mathrm{t}}o$ para $7n\epsilon t\epsilon’$ . functions $\theta_{1}(s_{1})$ and $\theta_{2}(s_{1})_{S}atisfy$ that $\theta_{1}(s_{1})>\theta_{2}(s_{1})\geq 0_{i}$
it follo $n$) $\mathrm{L}\backslash ^{\neg}$ that
$\overline{T}_{\theta_{1}}(S_{1})\leq\overline{T}_{\theta_{\sim}},(_{S_{1})}$ .
(2) If $\overline{T}_{\theta}(s_{1})<0$ , it holds that $\theta(s_{1})\geq\overline{\theta}(s_{1})$ .
(3) $If\overline{T}_{\theta}(s_{1})>0$ , it holds that $\theta(s_{1})\leq\overline{\theta}(s_{1})$ .
(4) If $\theta(s_{1})>\overline{\theta}(s_{1})$ , it holds that $\overline{\tau}_{\theta}(s_{1})\leq 0$ .
(5) If $\theta(s_{1})<\overline{\theta}(s_{1})_{f}$ it holds that $\overline{\tau}_{\theta}(s_{1})\geq 0$ .
Proof. (1) If $\theta_{1}(s_{1})>\theta_{2}(s_{1})$ , then, we get $\theta_{1}(S_{1})U(.f, g)(S1)>\theta_{2}(S_{1})U(.f,g)(s_{1})$ ,
because $U(f,g)(s1)$ is positive for all $(.f, g)\in F\cross G$ . Then, it follows that for all
$(.f, g)\in F\mathrm{x}G$ ,
$T_{\theta_{1}}(.f, g)(s1)<T_{\theta_{2}}(.f.,g)(s1)$ .
Therefore, we get that
$\overline{T}_{\theta_{1}}(S_{1})=\inf_{f\in F\lrcorner c}\sup_{\in G}\tau_{\theta}1(.f., g)(s1)$
$\leq\inf_{f\in Fg}\sup_{G\in}T_{\theta_{2}}(f, g)(S_{1})$
$=\overline{T}_{\theta_{2}}(s_{1})$ .
Thus, the proof of (1) in the lelnma is colnplete.
(2) Sillce $\overline{\tau}\theta(s_{1})<0$ , from the definition of $\overline{T}_{\theta}(s_{1})$ , there $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{i}_{\mathrm{S}}\mathrm{t}_{\mathrm{S}}\overline{f\backslash }\in F$ such
$\mathrm{t}1\overline{\perp}$at $\sup_{g\in G}\tau\theta(\overline{.f\cdot},g)(s1)<0$ , that is, for all $g\in G$ ,
$T_{\theta}(\overline{.f\cdot},(j)(s_{1})=U(\overline{f}, g)(S_{1})-\theta(s1)V(\overline{.f\cdot}, g)(S1)<0$ . (2.4)
From (2.4), this shows that for all $g\in G$ ,
$W( \overline{.f}, g)(S1)=\frac{U(\overline{f},g)(S1)}{V(\overline{f},g)(S1)}<\theta(s_{1})$ (2.5)
$\mathrm{t}1_{1}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}$ is,
$\sup_{Jc\in G}W(\overline{\backslash f}, g)(S1)\leq\theta(s_{1})$ . (2.6)
Fronl the definition of $\overline{\theta}(s_{1})$ and (2.6), it follows that $\theta(s_{1})\geq\overline{\theta}(s_{1})$ .
(3) Since $\overline{\tau}\theta(s_{1})>0$ , that is, for all $f\in F,$ $\sup_{cJ}.\in GT\theta(.f\cdot, \mathit{9})(s1)>0$ , there
exists $g_{j}\in G$ , which depends on $f\cdot$ , such that
$T_{\theta}(.f., g_{J})(S_{1})=U(.f.,cyJ)(S_{1})-\theta(S_{1})V(.f\cdot, gJ)(S_{1})>0$. (2.7)
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From (2.7), it follows that for all $f\in F,$ $W(f, g_{f})(S_{1})=U(.f, g_{f})(S1)/V(f, g_{f})(s_{1})>$
$\theta(s_{1})$ . This shows that $\overline{\theta}(s_{1})\geq\theta(s_{1})$ .
(4) Since $\theta(s_{1})>\overline{\theta}(s_{1})$ , from the definition of $\overline{\theta}(s_{1})$ , there exists $\overline{f}\in F$ such
that for all $g\in G$ ,
$\theta(s_{1})>\sup_{\in gG}W(\overline{\backslash \cdot}, g)f(s1)$ .
This shows that for all $g\in G,$ $T_{\theta}(\overline{f}, g)(s_{1})<0$ . Hence, we get that
$0 \geq\sup T_{\theta}g\in G(\overline{f}, g)(S_{1})$
$\geq\inf_{f\in F}\sup_{\prime C\in G}\tau_{\theta}(f, g)(S_{1})$
$=\overline{T}_{\theta}(s_{1})$ .
(5) Since $\overline{\theta}(s_{1})>\theta(s_{1})$ , from the definition of $\overline{\theta}(S_{1})$ , it follows that for all
$f\in F$ ,
$\sup_{g\in G}W(f, g)(S_{1})>\theta(s_{1})$ .
$\mathrm{T}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{u}\dot{\mathrm{s}}$ , there exists $g_{f}\in G$ , which depends on.$f$ , such that $W(f, g_{f})(s_{1})>\theta(s_{1})$ ,
that is, for all $f\in F$ ,
$\sup_{g\in G}T_{\theta}(f, g\mathrm{I}(s_{1})\geq T_{\theta}(f, gf)(s_{1})$
$>0$ .
Hence, we get that
$\overline{T}_{\theta}(s_{1})=$ inf $\sup T_{\theta}(f, g)(s1)\geq 0$ .
$f\in F_{j}C\in G$
$\square$
Lemma 2.2 $\underline{T}_{\theta}(s_{1})$ has the following properties.
(1) If two $param6te\uparrow$ . functions $\theta_{1}(s_{1})a\uparrow\iota d\theta_{2}(s_{1})$ satisfy that $\theta_{1}(\underline{.}9_{1})>\theta_{2}(s_{1})\geq 0_{i}$
$it.foll_{\mathit{0}}wS$ that
$\underline{T}_{\theta_{1}}(S_{1})\leq\underline{T}_{\theta_{2}}(s1)$ .
(2) $If\underline{T}_{\theta}(s_{1})<0_{f}$ it holds that $\theta(s_{1})\geq\underline{\theta}(s_{1})$ .
(3) $If\underline{T}_{\theta}(s_{1})>0$ , it holds that $\theta(s_{1})\leq\underline{\theta}(s_{1})$ .
(4) If $\theta(s_{1})>\underline{\theta}(s_{1})$ , it holds that $\underline{\tau}_{\theta}(s_{1})\leq 0$ .
(5) If $\theta(s_{1})<\underline{\theta}(s_{1})_{i}$ it holds that $\underline{T}_{\theta}(S_{1})\geq 0$ .
Proof. Using $\underline{T}_{\theta}(s_{1})$ and $\underline{\theta}(s_{1})$ instead of $\overline{T}_{\theta}(s_{1})$ and $\overline{\theta}(s_{1})$ , respectively. we
can prove this lemma by sinlilar argunlents to the previous one. $\square$
We have the following relations between the game $(DFG)$ and $(DPG_{\theta})$ .




(2) $If\overline{T}_{\theta^{*}}(s_{1})\leq 0,$ $g^{*}$ is a $\max$-inf of the game $(DPG_{\theta^{\mathrm{x}}})$ .
Proof. (1) From the definition of $\overline{\theta}(s_{1})$ and $\underline{\theta}(s_{1})$ , in general it holds that
$\overline{\theta}(s_{1})\geq\underline{\theta}(s_{1})$ .
On the other hand, since $g^{*}\in G$ is a $\max$-inf of the game $(DFG)$ , it follows
that
$\overline{\theta}(s_{1})=\mathrm{i}_{1}1\mathrm{f}Wf\in F(.f., g^{*})(s1)$
$\leq\sup_{g\in G}\inf_{f\in F}W(.f\cdot, g)(s1)$
$=\underline{\theta}(s_{1})$ .
Thus, the ganue $(DFG)$ has a value function, that is, $\overline{\theta}=\underline{\theta}$ on $S_{1}$ .
(2) Since $g^{*}\in G$ is a $\max$-inf of the game $(DFG)$ , it holds that for all $f\in F$ ,
$\theta^{*}(_{S_{1}})=\inf_{\in fF}W(f, g^{*})(S_{1})\leq W(f, g^{*})(S_{1})$
that is, for all $f\in F$ ,
$0 \leq T_{\theta^{*}}(.f,g^{*})(S1)\leq\sup_{g\in G}T_{\theta}*(f, g)(S_{1})$. (2.8)
Thus, from (2.8) and (2) of the theorem, we get the following :
$0 \leq\inf_{f\in F}T_{\theta}*(f, g^{*})(S_{1})$
$\leq\inf_{f\in F}\sup_{g\in G}\tau_{\theta}*(f, g)(S_{1})$
$=\overline{T}_{\theta^{*}}(s_{1})\leq 0$ .
This shows that
$\inf_{J\in F}\tau_{\theta}*(f,g)*(s1)=\mathrm{i}_{11}\mathrm{f}\sup\tau\theta^{*}(j\in Fg\in G^{\cdot}f, g)(s1)$ .
That is, $g^{*}$ is a $\max$-inf of the game $(DPG_{\theta}*)$ . $\square$
Corollary 2.1 Suppose that $(f^{*},g^{*})\in F\cross G$ is a saddle point of the game
$(DFG)$ . Then, it holds that
(1) $T_{\theta^{*}}(f*, g)*(s1)=0$ .
(2) $(f^{*}, g^{*})$ is a saddle point of the game $(DPG_{\theta}*)$ .
The proof of the corollary is easily given by Theorem 2.1.
Theorem 2.2 Under $\overline{\theta}(S_{1})=\underline{\theta}(s_{1})=\theta^{*}(s_{1})$ , suppose that $g^{*}\in G$ is a $\max-\inf$
of the game $(DPG_{\theta}*)$ and
$\inf_{f\in F}T_{\theta}*(.t, g^{*})(S_{1})=\overline{T}_{\theta}*(s_{1})\geq 0$ .
Then, $g^{*}\dot{\iota}s$ a $\max$-inf of the $gam\epsilon(DFG)$ .
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Proof. $\mathrm{S}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{C}\mathrm{e}\overline{\tau}\theta^{*}(s_{1})\geq 0$ and $g^{*}$ is a $\max$-inf of the game $(DPG_{\theta}*)$ , it follows
that
$0 \leq\inf_{f\in Fg}\sup_{\in G}.T_{\theta}*(f, g)(S_{1})$
$=$ inf $T_{\theta^{*}}(f, g^{*})’(S_{1})$
$j\in F$
$\leq T_{\theta^{*}}(f,g^{*})(S_{1})$ for all$f\in F$,
which implies that for all $f\in F$ ,
$\theta^{*}(s_{1})\leq W(f, g^{*})(S_{1})\leq\sup_{g\in G}W(f,g)(S_{1})$ .




This shows $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}g^{*}$ is a $\max$-inf of the ganle $(DFG)$ . $\square$
Corollary 2.2 Under $\overline{\theta}(S_{1})=\underline{\theta}(s_{1})=\theta^{*}(s_{1})_{i}$ suppose that $(f^{*},g^{*})\in F\cross G$ is a
saddle $poi\uparrow?\theta$ of the game $(DPG_{\theta}*)$ and $T_{\theta^{*}}(f*, g)*(.5_{1})=0$ holds. $Then_{f}(.f^{*}, g^{*})$
is a saddle $po\dot{i}nt$ of the game $(DFG)$ .
The proof of the corollary is easily given by Theorenl 2.2.
References
[1] J.P.Aubin, Optima and Equilibria (Springer-Verlag, New York\rangle 1993).
[2] J.P. Crouzeix, J.A. Ferland and S. Schaible, An Algorithm for Generalized Fractional
Programs, Jour.Optim.The.Appl., 47, No.1, (1985), 35-49.
[3] K. Fan, Minimax theorems, Ploc. Nat. Acad. Sci. USA, 39 (1953), 42-47.
[4] Y.Kimura, Y.Sawasaki and IC Tanaka, A Perturbation on Two-Person Zero-Sum Games,
to appear in Annals of Dynamic Games.
[5] K.Tanaka and K,Yokoyama, On $\tau$.-Equilibrium Point in a $\mathrm{N}_{011}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{P}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}?1$ -Person
Game, J. Math. Anal. Appl., 160 (1991), 413-423.
11
